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OF COMMONWEALTHS AND OUR COMMONWEALTH:
AN INTRODUCTION
Colin Crawford
The germ of the idea that became this symposium theme was planted in
Bogot, Colombia, at a conference on comparative constitutionalism held at
the University of the Andes in the spring of 2017. Over drinks one night with
Amnon Lev--one of the participants in this first iteration of the "Future of
the Commonwealth" symposiun- was describing my impending move to
the Commonwealth of Kentucky to become Dean of the Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law at the University of Louisville. I deliberately referred to
Kentucky as a "commonwealth" when speaking with Amnon because much
of our conference found us discussing the intricacies of modern constitutional
and contractarian theory, with references to the ideas of the "commonwealth" that justified the foundation of liberal democracies created to satisfy
shared political, social, and economic needs.
Amnon, a Dane, expressed astonishment. "Commonwealth?" he asked.
"The place is actually a commonwealth?" "Indeed, it is," I explained.
Kentucky is, in the U.S. context, an older state. Like three other states,
namely Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia (of which Kentucky was
once a part), the state formally retains the "commonwealth" nomenclature.
Amnon, a scholar of modern legal history and legal philosophy,' was
absolutely fascinated by this, and asked a series of questions. Did the fact that
it was a commonwealth affect the law in Kentucky today? Was this fact
reflected in the organization or administration of the state in any particular
way? Unfortunately, I had no answers for him; I had yet to move to the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
However, this did lead to an idea that I developed that evening and again
further at the conference the next day, with Amnon and with a third
contributor to this volume, Daniel Bonilla. I asked them, "What if we were
to do a conference on the future of the commonwealth, to explore the
meanings of that term when it was in common use, and to examine how it is
being used today, to try and connect past with present practice and concept?"
Those discussions led to the symposium that gave birth to this volume,
and to an idea for the University of Louisville Law Review going forward.

See, e.g., AMNON LEV, THE FEDERAL IDEA: PUBLIC LAW BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL
LIFE (2017); AMNON LEV, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF POWER
(2014).
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The idea was simple: as often as it wished, the Law Review would seek to
assemble a talented and diverse group of scholars to discuss a topic
concerning some aspect of the "Future of the Commonwealth." The legal
focus could be historical or it could be quite contemporary. It could be about
the Commonwealth of Kentucky in particular or about the "commonwealth"
in the larger, metaphorical sense of our common civic, social, and political
goals and challenges.
Upon arriving in Kentucky, I took this to the then-editors of the Law
Review, Adam Wetherington and Chase Cunningham. They were sold, and
in turn, sold this idea to their respective successors, Elizabeth Penn and Kylie
King. An idea was about to become reality.

For this first iteration, it was decided that we would attempt to lay some
of the theoretical foundations for the years ahead. That is, this volume would
look back at earlier conceptions of the idea of a "commonwealth," such that
we might build upon the idea in future years by focusing on more current
legal and policy challenges, debates, and issues, whether in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky or the larger national or international
commonwealth that any group seeks to protect or create.
We also settled on a format designed to promote rigorous intellectual
debate and interaction. Contributors were invited on the condition that, prior
to the event, they produce a draft article well before the symposium. These
drafts were then circulated among all other participants and among the
members of the Law Review editorial staff who would edit them. On the
actual day of the event, contributors had five to ten minutes to reiterate their
ideas-working on the assumption that others had already read their
contributions-and then debate of the contributions began. Weeks later,
informed by these debates and discussions, contributors revised their pieces
and resubmitted for publication. The results are what you have here. I think I
speak for all of us present that the nature of the interaction was an especially
fruitful one, a mode of academic exchange that promoted focused attention
on the contributions and frank discussion. It is my hope and expectation that
the model will continue to thrive in future "Future of the Commonwealth"
symposia.

The symposium articles published here represent a range of
considerations of the meaning and implications of the word
"commonwealth," as well as its predecessors and some of its distant
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antecedents. In all, the articles cover over 400 years of history. In the first
article, historian Sarah Morgan Smith examines a predecessor notion to
commonwealth, namely the idea of "communion" among the Puritans of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony.2 Morgan Smith begins with a broad survey of the
Puritan notions of communion-or of common purpose dictated by a divine
order and moral code-and then turns her attention to the preacher Thomas
Shepard and his legal exegesis performed at the request of the Bay Colony's
General Court in 1636. Morgan Smith then examines the theological origins
of what today we might call Puritan legal theory, explaining that the process
took over a decade to cement such that "Shepard's vision of a commonwealth
grounded in the consent of the governed and guided by strong laws [could]
be realized."3 As Morgan Smith goes on to demonstrate, the Puritans
struggled mightily with the question of how specific men (and they meant
men at the time) had to be in the articulation of laws and rules in order for a
civic order to function well. For a society based on a religious foundation,
this was a question of great moment; religious leaders and "magistrates" were
not, as Morgan Smith makes clear, necessarily allied. Indeed, as she points
out, for a minister as famous as John Winthrop, there were two kinds of
liberty-natural liberty and civil liberty. The latter was that of a covenanted
civil society, bound to a code for purposes of working jointly in the service
of Christian values. In sum, Morgan Smith's intricately detailed piece
provides a valuable reflection on early statements in what became our own
democratic traditions about the ability to secure one's personal liberty by
ascribing to values of a group.
Like Morgan Smith, Luke Milligan's piece is interested in the interplay
between natural law and what we have come to know as social contract
theories.' Milligan's article specifically considers the role of higher education
in the commonwealth. Milligan begins with a look at some of the natural law
bases of society, pressing us to consider the value of establishing
commonwealths with a "natural purpose."' He thus argues that thinkers from
Aristotle to Locke and beyond have made a case for some sort of "natural
purpose" argument as a foundation of political society.' Milligan then moves
from this argument and uses it as a springboard to consider two questions:
"First, do commonwealths heighten natural obligations to pursue 'the good

2

Sarah A- Morgan Smith, Commonwealth as Civic Communion, 57 U. LDUISVILLE L. REv. 467 (2019).

3 Id

at 489.

Luke Milligan, NaturalLaw, Commonwealths, andHigherEducation, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 501

(2019).
Id. at 504.
6 Id. at 504-06.
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life'? And second, are universities helpful in these pursuits?"7 In answering
the first question, Milligan concludes that "the relative security provided by
commonwealths heightens individuals' obligations to pursue previously
neglected aspects of the good life."' With respect to the second question, he
observes in part as follows: "three basic goods-knowledge, aesthetic
experience, and practical reasonableness-can be advanced through
formalized education." 9 Milligan concludes by proposing a robust set of
approaches to help universities refocus on the delivery of these "basic
goods."
The next two contributions to this symposium use as their starting point
the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, the social contractarian thinker
whose ideas are so central to the intellectual history of modem democratic
societies, including the United States. The first of these is Amnon Lev's
contribution."o In his contribution, Lev seeks to lay bare the challenge for
democratic theory-in commonwealths-of "sociality,"" and then to engage
a discussion between Hobbes and the twentieth century U.S. political theorist
John Rawls. In this, says Lev, he seeks "to consider the attempt by Rawls to
reframe contract theory so as to disembed it from its Hobbesian setting and
give it purchase on social life."l2 As Lev notes, Rawls omitted Hobbes from
his list of social contract theorists in whose steps he followed, a choice with
curious consequences. As Lev goes on to explain, "Hobbes is in fact hovering
in the background" of Rawls's thought,' 3 as the latter seeks to account for
social discord. I will leave it to the reader to engage with Lev's dissection of
Rawls's thought looked at through the lens of Hobbes's ideas (and vice
versa). As Lev notes in concluding, Rawls reveals the limitations of Hobbes
as a social contractarian, just as "Hobbes shows Rawls's belief in the capacity
of human nature to work itself pure to be naYve, anachronistic, and
misguided."l 4
My own contribution here" also uses Hobbes as its point of departure,
though looks at his ideas more narrowly. Moreover, my article shares some
of the thematic concerns of Milligan's, discussed above, as I, like him, seek

Id at 501.
Id. at 508.
9 Id. at 511-12.
"o Amnon Lev, Hobbes, Rawls, and the Theory of Commonwealth, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 519
(2019).
11Id
I2 Id. at 520.
" Id. at 531.
14 Id. at 540.
15 Colin Crawford, On the Role of Universities in the Common-wealth,
57 U. LouIsVuILE L. REv. 543
(2019).
7
8
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to understand better the theoretical justification for institutions of higher
learning in a commonwealth. In particular, I work to understand what an early
contractarian thinker like Hobbes believed to be the role of learning and in
particular of higher education. As I show, Hobbes had a low view of the
universities of his day, finding them temples of ancient and socially
destructive backward thinking. Nonetheless, Hobbes also believed that
universities, when well-run and forward-thinking, were essential to the
operation of a modern, enlightened state.16 I then put these ideas in a mirror,
to compare them to modern debates about universities. In this, I attempt to
show that modern debates reveal an inverted picture: the radical Hobbes
would be welcomed in today's universities where, many claim, more
17
conservative, order-respecting ideas are rejected. I will leave it for readers
to draw their conclusions about the meaning and value of these debates,
whether in Hobbes's time or our own, although I do suggest that universities
may usefully serve to strike a balance between order and intellectual
disruption in order to realize a well-functioning society.
The next contribution, from Daniel Bonilla, considers aspects of the
thought of the French Enlightenment thinker Montesquieu.s Bonilla sets out
to understand a basic question, namely "to explore how the comparative
method, geography, and climate intersect in Montesquieu to explain the basic
structures of political communities."1 9 In so doing, Bonilla's further aim, as
he explains, is to understand Montesquieu's role as "the paradigmatic
representative of the first and more prominent efforts to use the comparative
method in modern law and politics."2 0 This matters, Bonilla argues, because
the assumptions underlying and analytical implications of Montesquieu's
2
method "remains rooted in contemporary legal and political imagination."
This method, Bonilla demonstrates, has profound consequences for how we
view different legal systems and their societies since Montesquieu's
comparativism determines how we understand and view the subjects of law.
As Bonilla writes: "Montesquieu's argumentation constructs a subject that is
constituted both by what it is and what it is not.

. .

. The northern man is

masculine, valiant, enterprising, daring, active, and not very sensitive, and he

See id. at 554.
" See id. at 557.
' Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Montesquieu and Modem ComparativeLaw, Climate, Geography, and
the Structure ofPoliticalCommunities, 57 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 561 (2019).
16

19 Id.

Id. at 562.
21 Id. at 563. This is a theme that Bonilla has been developing, in different work, in recent years. See,
for example, Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, The Political Economy of Legal Knowledge, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS 29-78 (Colin Crawford & Daniel Bonilla Maldonado eds., 2018).
20
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values his individual autonomy positively. The southern man is weak,
effeminate, cowardly, not very enterprising, timid, lazy, and sensitive, and he
does not value his individual autonomy very much." 22 As Bonilla goes on to
analyze, this narrative-despite Montesquieu's claimed commitment to
human autonomy-sets some (those from the Global North) up to be viewed
as succeeding at law and enlightened living, while leaving others (those in
the Global South) to fail. Bonilla thus powerfully invites us to question the
methods for comparing legal systems established at least since the
Enlightemnent-a time influential in forming the bases of the U.S. legal
tradition, among others.
Like Bonilla, Deirdre Bowen's contribution reflects a concern with the
dominance of a theoretical structure purportedly designed to enlighten and
defend beneficial social values while in fact reifying divisions and
inequalities.2 3 In particular, Bowen turns to an unlikely source for thinking
about the commonwealth, namely sociological theory and in particular the
texts of Emile Durkheim. Her starting point is unlikely because, as she
begins: "[t]he notion of the commonwealth is not a concept clearly articulated
in sociological theory." 24 In Bowen's view, although Durkheim was a
powerful articulator and defender of what we now understand as human
rights and individual dignity, he also developed a theory that largely excluded
from his "human rights paradigm" 25 over half of the human population-that
is, his theory devalued and delegitimized the social role of women.
Specifically, Bowen argues that Durkheimian theory protects and rationalizes
"a patriarchal society that continues to subjugate women on the basis of a
discourse of biological and social determinism." 26 Bowen then goes on to
contemplate the #MeToo movement and demonstrates how many of the ways
it was characterized reflect the continuing and, for women, pernicious social,
civil, and political consequences of Durkheim's theory.
In the symposium's last contribution, Justin Walker and Kirk Smith27 use
Abraham Lincoln's first message to Congress to understand what the
Kentucky-born President had to say about a number of issues pressing to the
state and future of our commonwealth (by which I mean our country and not
the Commonwealth of Kentucky). In particular, in their article, they "want to
explore what Lincoln had to say about four specific topics that are important
to the commonwealth: the balance required by federalism; the balance

22
2
24
25
26

21

Bonilla Maldonado, supra note

18, at 580-81.
Deirdre M. Bowen, #NotMe: A Commonwealth for Mankind, 57 U. LDuisvILLE L. REv. 587 (2019).
Id.

id.
Id. at 588.
Justin Walker & Gregory Kirk Smith, Lincoln's Lessons, 57 U. LouisviLLE
L. REv. 613 (2019).
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between security and liberties; the balance between presidential and
congressional power; and the balance for statesmen between listening and
leading."2 8 In their article, Walker and Smith examine a number of
controversial moments and decisions during Lincoln's presidency and his
response to them, suggesting that Lincoln's example "illuminate[s] ajourney
of discovery each American must travel with his or her own compass. The
progress of our commonwealth does not depend on perfect answers. It
requires only that with humility and good faith, with one eye on yesterday's
tutors and the other on tomorrow's possibilities, every citizen continues
asking the questions that demanded the attention of history's wisest
President." 29
In sum, this volume reflects a diverse and provocative set of
contributions that undertake to excavate the meaning of our
"commonwealth" and to understand how those meanings, and the values they
represent, can advance or detract from the achievement of our individual and
shared interests. It is my sincere hope that this will be but the first of many
such symposium editions that explore our potential for building a stronger
and more just commonwealth, whether in the Commonwealth of Kentucky
or in commonwealths beyond its border.

28

Id. at 614.

29

Id. at 638.

